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THE COMPARATIVE STUDY OF LAW FOR POLICY PURPOSES:
VALUE CLARIFICATION AS AN INSTRUMENT OF
DEMOCRATIC WORLD ORDER*
By MYRES S. McDOUALt
"[E]very true science employs a method of which the technical and professional
schools make little use. This method is comparison. It is preeminently the scientific
method; without the employment of the comparative method, no body of lmowledge
regarding the facts of social life can take rank as a science."
Smith, A General View of European Leal History and Other Papcrs 263 (1927).
"The method of natural science rests always on the comparison of observed phe-
nomena, and the aim of such comparison is by a careful examination of diversities to
discover underlying uniformities. Applied to human societies the comparative
method used as an instrument for inductive inference will enable us to discover the
universal, essential, characters which belong to all human societies, past, present, and
future. The progressive achievement of knowledge of this kind must be the aim of
all who believe that a veritable science of human society is possible and desirable."
Radcliffe-Brown, Preface in Fortes & Evans-Pritchard, .4frican Political S'ystmcn
i (1940).
IN a world shrinking at an ever accelerating rate because of a relentlessly
expanding, uniformity-imposing technology, both opportunity and need for
the comparative study of law are unprecedented. In this contemporary world,
people are increasingly demanding common values that transcend the bound-
aries of nation-states; they are increasingly interdependent in fact, irrespective
of nation-state boundaries, for controlling the conditions which affect the
securing of their values; and they are becoming ever more realistic in their
consciousness of such interdependences, and hence widening their identifi-
cations to include in their demands more and more of their fellow men.'
These changing perspectives of peoples the world over stimulate in turn ever
intensifying demands for wider and wider political cooperation, for the more
and more effective use of conjoined community power, in order to secure
newly clarified and established goals. A general purpose world organization,
a host of ancillary and subsidiary organizations and agencies, a great range
of regional pacts and understandings and of functional unifications, and multi-
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plied thousands of multilateral and bilateral agreements all bear witness, and
the beginning only is here. 2 The values for which this cooperation is demanded
embrace the whole of our present-day democratic preferences for a peaceful
world. Such values include not only security, in the sense of full opportunity,
free from violence and threats of violence, to pursue all values by peaceful,
non-coercive procedures, but also all the other value-variables upon which
such security depends :3
the wide sharing of power, both formal and effective, including parti-
cipation in the processes of government and of parties and pressure
groups, and equality before the law;
freedom of inquiry and opinion and for communication of the en-
lightenment by which rational decisions can be made;
the access to resources and technology necessary to the production
of goods and services for maintenance of rising standards of living and
comfort;
2. SOHN, CASES AND OTHER MATERIALS ON WORLD LAw (1950); Ds Russrr
STRENGTHENING THE FRA EWORK OF PEACE (1950); LEvI, FUNDAMENTALS OF WORLD
ORGANIZATION (1950); HOLBORN, THE PoLITICAL COLLAPSE OF EUROPE (1951). Bnnu,
REGIONAL ORGANIZATIONS: THEIR FUNCTIONS AND POTENTIALITIES IN TIlE WORLD COM-
MUNITY (unpublished J.S.D. thesis in Yale Law School Library, 1951).
3. The itemization that follows is one designed to permit, by the use of appropriate
operational indices, the most detailed comparative description of varying legal doctrines
and practices, and will be employed in later sections of this article. The reference to
"value-variables" is intended to emphasize that each value may in varying contexts be
both a value that is demanded and a base of power for affecting the distribution of values.
For more detailed statement of the type of analysis proposed, see Lasswell & McDougal,
Legal Education and Public Policy: Professional Training in the Public Interest, 52
YALE L.J. 203 (1943) ; LASSWELL & KAPLAN, POWER AND SOCIETY (1950) ; McDougal
& Leighton, The Rights of Man in the World Community: Constitutional Illusions Versus
Rational Action, 59 YALE L. J. 60 (1949); THE POLICY ScIacES (Lerner & Lasswell
eds. 1951).
We emphasize "policy purposes" because we regard a jurisprudence which purports
to be "scientific" only as inadequate. As important as it is for an observer not to permit
his preferences to distort his vision of the events being observed, a creative jurisprudence
requires not only the ways of thinking and procedures of observation commonly called
scientific but also a number of other integrated and interrelated methods of thought and
observation. Such other methods include the clarification of goal values, the description
of historical and contemporary trends in the realization of values, the critical projection
of trends into the future on the basis of historical and scientific knowledge, and the !n-
vention and evaluation of alternatives of policy by which fundamental goal values can be
most fully attained. The use of scientific procedures alone may, as many studies have
demonstrated, be utterly haphazard and sterile. The other modes of thinking and "obser-
vation are required to guide the use of scientific procedures to important problems, to
determine the degree of quantification or mathematicization necessary in any particular
investigation, and to process any knowledge acquired for use by decision-makers. Effective
inquiry into law requires emphasis upon both policy and science-in sum, a disciplined
use of all relevant modes of thinking and observation.
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the fundamental respect for human dignity which both precludes dis-
crimination based on race, sex, color, religion, political opinion, or other
ground irrelevant to capacity and provides a positive recognition of
common merit as a human being and special merit as an individual;
health and well-being and inviolability of the person, with freedom
from criel and inhuman punishments and positive opportunity for the
development of talents and enrichment of personality;
opportunity for the acquisition of the skill necessary to express talent
and to achieve individual and community values to the fullest;
opportunity for affection, fraternity, and congenial personal relation-
ships in groups freely chosen;
and, finally, freedom to justify common standards of responsibility and
rectitude, to explain life, the universe, and values, and to worship God
or gods as may seem best.
It needs no new emphasis that our contemporary demands for cooperation
that transcends nation-state boundaries in the shaping and sharing of values
occur in the context of a world power process.4 In this process the policies
that determine the degree to which we can achieve our values are formulated
by many participants--conveniently categorized as nation-states, international
governmental organizations, political parties, pressure groups, private asso-
ciations, and individual human beings-in multitudinous interactions, the rami-
fications and effects of which are global in their reach. The practices by
which any one participant engages in this process, the bases of its power,
and the area, scope, and weight of influence it achieves are obviously directly
affected by the practices, bases of power, and effects achieved by each of the
other participants. Thus, how a nation-state controls its people and resources
and organizes its institutions as bases of power, how it structures and operates
its foreign affairs procedures for peace and war, and how it regulates and
controls or supports and exports political parties, pressure groups, and private
associations, may vitally affect the general practices of other nation-states
and their willingness or unwillingness to engage in particular measures of
cooperation. Such practices may also affect the amount of power that can be
conferred upon international governmental organizations and the trans-national
roles that can be permitted to parties, pressure groups, private associations,
and individual human beings. It is, therefore, an opportunity of overwhelming
urgency for the comparative study of law to explore the power processes of
the nation-states of the world and to clarify the variables, both predispositional
and environmental, which move different decision-makers in different nation-
states. The urgency of this opportunity is no less whether one's expectations
4. SCHWARZENBERGER, PowER PoUrcs (2d. rev. ed. 1951); SPYxu€l, Tm GrG-
RAPHY OF THE PEACE (1944).
5. For development see McDougal, The Role of Lau in World Polites, 20 Miss.
LJ. 253 (1949) and Law and Power, 46 Am. J. INT'L L 102 (1952).
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are of future peace or of imminent world-wide violence or whether one
envisages the whole globe as the area of cooperation or only certain accessible
portions of the globe.0 The need is for that understanding of the power
processes of ourselves and others which can give us both realistic orientation
in the world power process as a whole and the special insight required for
effective cooperation in the promotion of each of our basic democratic values,
whatever the exigencies of future violence and whatever the area in which
we can work.
7
It may be questioned, however, whether our traditional conceptions and tech-
niques of comparative study are adequate to meet such contemporary need.
Despite many exhortations over a period of years," contributions important to
understanding and cooperation are relatively few and little important work is
presently being done in our law schools or elsewhere.9 Almost any sampling of
current literature and comment reveals sharp discontent with the effects
6. See Loewenstein, Stoke & Cole, The Role of Comparative Government in
RESEARCH IN POLITICAL SCIENCE 17 (Griffith ed. 1948): "In this period of total war,
which has added to belligerency of a military, economic, and diplomatic character political
warfare as a way to victory, the knowledge of foreign political institutions and ideologies
has become of paramount importance. Cooperative government has been transformed
from a Cinderella-like academic discipline into a political instrumentality of the most m-
mediate potency. It is obvious that without intimate knowledge of their political insti-
tutions and attitudes we could not hope to understand what makes our enemies strong, or
to pierce their psychological armor; nor would we be able to assist them after the war
in reintegration into the world community, in case this should be our task."
7. Cf. Yntema: Conparative Research and Unification of Law, 41 Mct L REV.
261 (1942) ; Research in Inter-American Law at the University of Michigan, 43 Mien.
L. REv. 549 (1944) ; and Book Review, 54 YALE L.J. 889 (1945) ; Hazard, Comparative
Law in Legal Education, 18 U. OF CHI. L. REv. 264 (1951); F. Stone, The End to be
Served by Comparative Law, 25 TULANE L. REv. 325 (1951); I RABEL, THE CoNFUier
OF LAws: A COMPARATIVE STUDY xii (1945); DAVID, TRAniT EIf"MENTAIaE D8 Dnorr
CIVIL COMPARk 1-214 (1950) ; Czyzak, Book Review, 1950 WASH. U.L.Q. 548; and Kuhn,
The Function of the Comparative Method in Legal History and Philosophy, 13 TULANF
L. REv. 350 (1939).
8. One of the most useful articles still is Lepaulle, The Function of Comparative
Law, 35 HARv. L. REV. 838, 857, 858 (1922). M. Lepaulle urged: "But in a period like
the present, when many social organisms and functions are growing very rapidly, often
in unforeseeable ways, when the law, in many points, is already far behind the times,
when there is a rising discontent with the inadequacy of the law to meet the new condi-
tions, it seems that the first duty of any law school, either toward the science of law at
large, or toward its own country, is to train the new generation in such a way as to
enable it to meet the entirely new situations created by the new and, profound changes in
modem society." 
9. Note the relative paucity of studies cited in SCHLESINGER, COMPARATIVE. LAW
CASES AND MATERIALS 144 (1950).
It is not intended by this over-all negative appraisal to underestimate the importance
of certain specific contributions, such as those of Professor Rabel in Private lntcrnational
Law or of Professor Hazard in Russian Law. Such oases serve, however, only to make
more conspicuous the desert.
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being achieved.' 0 In typical summary Dean Wigmore some twenty years ago
characterized the "literature of comparative law" as being "marked frequently
by the barren dissection of verbal tests"'" and most recently Professor Von
Mehren in singling out one book for especial praise, offers contrast with
"the glib, overly general and painfully superficial treatments which have so
often passed current as comparative law."'
' 2
The causes of the failure of comparative study to rise to contemporary
need are of course various. Some observers have stressed lingering isola-
tionism 13 and narrow, ill-conceived vocationalism. 14 AMost fundamental, how-
ever, is the general failure of legal scholarship to invent and employ a method
adequate to the task of realistically describing and effectively appraising a
flow of authoritative decisions through time, i.e., for making fruitful com-
parisons through time, whether the comparisons are confined to decisions
within the boundaries of a single nation-state or extended across boundaries.' 5
The greatest confusion continues to prevail about what is being compared,
about the purposes of comparison, and about appropriate techniques. The
"law" that is being studied is still too often regarded as a body of doctrine
or rules, divorced from power and social processes. Studies are still organized,
and comparisons attempted, in terms of technical doctrines of highest level
10. Thus Stone, .supra note 7, at 334, writes: "Perhaps at no time in history have we
had so many conferences, so many books and exchanges and yet so little clear knowledge
of the end which they serve."
For a sampling of book reviews highly critical of present methods and results, see
Riesenfeld, 3 J. LEGAL ED. 620 (1951) ; Fulda, 36 CoRa.'. L. Q. 185 (190) ; F. Stone, 2,
N.Y.U.L.Q. Ruv. 239 (1951) ; Timasheff, id. at 393. And see Rashba, Consecrated Ignor-
ance of Foreign Law?, 39 CALIF'. I- RPv. 355 (1951).
1!. Wigmore, More Jottings on Comparative Legal Ideas and Institutions, 6 TuLAil
L REv. 244, 263 (1932).
12. Von Mehren, Book Review, 65 HARv. L. REV. 532, 534 (1952). The book praised
is DAwsoN, UNJUST ENRICHENT E: A COmP.ARATivE Ax.uxsis (1951).
13. Macmillan, Book Review, 63 L. Q. Rv. 2-7, 228 (1947) writes: "Isolationism
may well find its last refuge in the tenacity with which each nation clings to its ovm
legal system."
14. F. Stone, Book Review, 26 N.Y.U.L.Q. 239 (1951).
See Yntema, Research in Inter-American Law at the Unft'rsity of Michigan, 43
MIcH. L. REv. 549, 550 (1944): "Thus, until but recently, historical attachment to the
Common Law as a bond of Anglo-Saxon unity, acceptance of the formal, authoritarian
notion of law developed by Austin as the instrument of utilitarian reform, and the
approach to government as a branch of social science, the last outside the pale of law
proper, incongruously joined to form a basic philosophy of law in the United States, that
while it persisted, doomed legal science to exegetic impotence."
15. Yntema has made the point most cogently that fruitful historical study of decision-
making processes within a single nation-state requires perfection and application of com-
parative methods. See Roman Law as the Basis of Comparative LaLw, in 2 LAw: A
CF.NTtLRY OF PRCGRESS 346 (1937) and Research in Inter-Ainwrican Law at the Unfhcrsit.v
of Michigan, 43 Micn. L. REv. 549 (1944). Cf. Pollock, The History of Comnparative
.urisp-rdence, 5 J. CoNEP. LEG. 74 (1903) : .M.u.Ixowsxi, A ScMrxrIFJc THEonV OF CUt-
TURE AND OTHER ESSAYS (1944).
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ambiguity, doctrines which purport to perform in one and the same reference
the very different functions of describing past decisions, prescribing what
future decisions should be and predicting such decisions. The conception
of law as a decision-making process, and a process in which the decision-
makers are influenced by many variables, has had as yet but few effects.
Conceptions of scientific method for study of the variables, including technical
doctrines, that affect decisions are most inadequate. Precise study of trends
in decision and conditioning factors is almost non-existenf. Little effective
effort is made to relate decisions to basic community values or, when dis-
crepancies are observed, to clarify values and adopt a creative attitude in the
invention and adaptation of new means. The consequence is a literature that
is voluminous, obsessively repetitious, and sterile-a literature that feeds
and grows, like a psychic cancer, upon logical classification and reclassification
and technical refinement and sub-refinement, without limit and with a mini-
mum of external reference and relevance.
16
Remedy for the failure of comparative study must naturally begin with the
removal of its causes. Any program for the comparative study of law which
would be fruitful must, therefore, include among its intellectual tools three
indispensable prerequisites: first, a clear and realistic notion of what is being
compared; second, an understanding of and interest in the purposes of the
comparison sufficient to guide and sustain it; and, finally, techniques of com-
parison adequate to yield knowledge relevant to and sufficiently precise for
the purposes established.17 It is to each of these prerequisites that we propose
to direct a few preliminary and tentative observations?18
It is fortunately becoming increasingly recognized that what must be com-
pared, if comparisons are to be relevant and useful, is not doctrine merely
16. Hug & Ireland, The Progress of Comparative Law, 6 TULANE L. Ray. 68, 73
(1931) excoriate common procedures: "To take some rule or accepted formula covering
a definite point of doctrine in one system of law, find a similar expression in one or more
-other systems, and write a note or longer comment which could in effect be boiled down
to a quotation of the various provisions more or less adequately translated into the author's
language with references (as to the variously numbered sections of the respective national
codes) sufficient to enable the original versions to be found, neither involves important
mental processes by the writer nor excites contributory stimulation in the reader. A
numerically selective robot could produce as fruitful results from a good shelf of statutory
compilations. It may be remarked in passing that the character, as secondary source
material, of any discussion of one or more problems in the system of law of a single
jurisdiction or of the whole system itself (however exotic and remote ethnically or geog-
raphically) or of a single homogeneous group (as the civil law), is not altered by its
being presented in a language or place not its own; and such a presentation does not by
itself fall within our definition of comparative law."
17. Schmitthoff, The Science of Comparative Law, 7 CAmB. L.J. 95 (1939) makes
comparable demands and offers the beginnings of clarity in establishing an adequate theo-
retical structure.
18. Throughout this article the writer draws heavily upon collaborative studies with
Professor Harold Lasswell in seminars on Law, Science, and Policy and World Com-
munity and Law.
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but doctrine and practice, not a flow of rules merely, but a flow of decisions.10
Comparison cannot relevantly and usefully be confined to rules alone both
because rules are not the only variables that affect decision and because, as
embodiments of policy crystallizations of the past, they may not offer adequate
description of the effects of new decisions.20 The process of decision-making
is, indeed, one of continual redefinition of doctrine in the formation and
application of policy to ever-changing facts in ever-changing contexts. 21 The
variables to which decision-makers respond, the factors which affect decision,
are both environmental and predispositional. Environmental variables include
19. For inspiring application of this insight see LLEWELLYN & HoMeL, Tran
CHEENNE WAY (1941).
In The Progress of Comparathe Law, 6 TULANE L. REv. 68, 73 (1931), Hug and
Ireland make eloquent statement: "To understand the history of the rule, to trace its
principal sources, its developing vicissitudes, and its final formation and acceptance, to
appreciate its relation to other parts of the instant system, and, most important of all,
to learn its actual operation, to see what it does as distinct from what it says, by con-
sultation of the commentators and more importantly by e-amination of the actual decisions
of the courts, to carry through this analysis for each of the great systems of law, classi-
fying and discussing as many of the subdivisions as circumstances permit, to discover and
set forth the similarities and differences of the existing solutions, and then to make a
summation of the whole resultant with a view to an at least partial and temporarily valid
prediction as to the tendency of current doctrine and lines of decision, more correctly
constitutes the real purpose of comparative law."
In Research in Inter-American Law at the University of Michigan, 43 Micu. L. REv.
549, 557 (1944), Yntema insists: "fere formal collocation of the laws to be compared is
not adequate; account must be taken of the interpretative doctrines and their illuminating
applications by the courts to specific problems, as well as of the differing structures of
ideas, the historical background, and the special procedural and practical aspects, relat-
ing to each question. The problem is to examine not mere formulations in abstract but
functioning legal institutions, as they appear each in its more or less specific social con-
text.
'
20. Kahn-Freund makes concise summary in his Introduction to RENNEn, Tun IN-
STITUTIONS OF PRIVATE LAW AND THEIR SOCIAL FuNCrION (Kahn-Freund ed. 1949):
"Positivism is a utopia. The law is neither consistent nor self-sufficient. Whatever theorists
may say and whatever he himself may think and say, the judge constantly recurs to an
analysis, articulate or inarticulate, of the moral, social and economic function and effect
of the rules and principles he applies and of his own decision."
Contrast Sereni, On Teaching Comparative Law, 64 HAEv. L. Rmv. 770, 776 (1951),
who suggests that "a law course should study the law from within and in itself rather
than in relation to other standards of human conduct." He adds: "Although the study of
law as a social institution is an important topic, it belongs to the realm of social science,
rather than to the curriculum of a law school, inasmuch as such a study deals with the
law as an aspect of social behavior."
21. Judge Jerome Frank in Are Judges Human?, CoUrs ON TRIAL C. X (1949), offers
an informal account of the factors that may affect decision. See also CAxMozo, THE
NATURE OF THE JUDICIAL PROCESS (1921); GRu-N, JunoE AND JURy (1930); Coam:: &
COHEN, READINGS IN JURISPRUDENCE AN D LEGAL PHILOSOPHY C. VI (1951) ; Von Mehren,
Book Review, 63 HARV. L. REv. 370 (1949) (referring to continental judges); Douglas,
Stare DecisLs, 49 COL. L. REV. 735 (1949) ; Frankfurter, Some Reflections on the Rcading
of Statutes, 47 COL. L. REv. 527 (1947).
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the facts of a particular controversy, the competing claims of the parties, and
the standards invoked (comprising both technical legal doctrines in terms of
rights, duties, powers, property, title, contract, tort, sovereignty, due process,
and so on, and policy propositions in terms of basic community values), as
well as the whole community context.2 2 Predispositional variables include
the attitudes (demands for values, identifications, and expectations), skills,
class positions, and character structures of decision-makers.23 It is, therefore,
obvious that different decision-makers responding to different variables may
in cases which a disinterested observer would regard as comparable use the
same technical doctrines to reach different results or different technical doc-
trines to reach the same results.24 Hence, comparison even of technical doc-
trines can be made meaningful only when such doctrines are located in the
respective decision-making processes in which they are being used and ob-
servations are made of the equivalences and non-equivalences in effects which
different decision-makers responding to different variables achieve by the
use of such doctrines.2 . Comparison which extends beyond the traditional
fixation upon technical doctrine to the comprehensive and systematic investi-
22. For elaboration see McDougal, Future Interests Restated: Tradition Versus
Clarification and Reform, 55 HARV. L. REV. 1077 (1942) ; Lasswell & MeDougal, Legal
Education and Public Policy; Professional Training in the Public Interest, 52 YALE L. J.
203 (1943).
23. The relevance of such variables is outlined in detail by LASSW.LL, Powa AND
PERSONALITY (1948).
Mead in The Study of National Character in THE POLICY SCIEN ES (Lerner & Lass-
well eds. 1951) describes the present state of comparative research.
24. Demand for a "functional approach" to comparative study has been made many
times. Thus, Rheinstein in a classic and highly influential article on Teachhg Cofnparative
Law, 5 U. OF CHI. L. REV. 615, 617 (1938) wrote: "The statement that law is a means
of social control and organization has almost become a commonplace. Not all the impli-
cations of this proposition have been fully realized, however. For legal science, it implies
the task of inquiring into the social function of every legal rule and institution."
More recently in REPORT OF INSTITUTE IN THE TEACHING ON INTERNATIONAL AND
COMPARATIVE LAW, ASSOCIATION OF AmERIcAN LAW SCHOOLS 83, 111 (1948) Rabel
succinctly states: "Every comparison, of course, needs a common denominator, a terthlim
comparationis. For me in these fifty years past, this has always been the social purpose
of the rules and the service of the concepts to this purpose. This is now aptly called the
functional approach."
The demand for inquiring into functions is, however, but the beginning of insight.
Further questions are "functional" for whom, against whom, with respect to what values,
determined by what decision-makers under what conditions, how, with what effects. Com-
prehensive guiding theory must take all these questions into account.
25. Lepaulle makes the point forcefully: "First, it must be clear that a comparison
restricted to one legal phenomenon in two countries is unscientific and misleading. A legal
system is a unity, the whole of which expresses itself in each part; the same blood runs
in the whole organism. Hence each part must necessarily be seen in its relation to the
whole. An identical provision of the law of two countries may have wholly different moral
backgrounds, may have been brought about by the interplay of wholly different forces,
and hence the similarity may be due to the purest coincidence-no more significant than
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gation of the other important variables that affect decision must dearly require
the study and exposure of decision-making processes in their entirety -°
It may perhaps bear emphasis that the decisions requiring study are not
merely governmental decisions, that is, decisions by officials who have formal
authority and are expected by community myth to make important community
decisions. Formal authority and effective control may or may not be con-
joined in the same decision-makers in any given community.- Effective con-
trol over decision may in varying degree be located in governmental insti-
tutions, but it may also in degree equally varying be located in political parties
or pressure groups or private associations. The individuals who in fact make
the decisions may rely for their power not upon formal authority but upon
wealth, enlightenment, respect or other values.2 8 The degree to which the
the double meaning of a pun." The Function of Comparat ve Law, 35 HAns. L REV. 833,
853 (1922).
See also Pound, Philosophy of Law and Comparative Law, 100 U. OF PA. L REv. 1
(1951): "But a fruitful comparative law must involve more than comparison of legal
precepts, important as that is. There should be comparison of systems of law as systems,
not merely precept by precept" Cf. Schmitthoff, The Science of Comparative Law, 7
Ckm L.J. 95, 97 (1939).
The big question is, however, how an organization of studies can be perfected which
will permit either the comparison of systems or the making of partial comparisons which
can contribute to comprehensive understanding.
26. Margaret Mead generalizes: "The science of culture can insist, therefore, that
when we consider contrasting types of behavior we shall attend always to the complete
system, and that random, indiscriminate citations of cultural contrasts in detail be strictly
recognized for what they are, iconoclastic polemic material, ammunition for agitators, but
with no scientific validity." The Comparative Study of Culture and The Purposize Culti-
vation of Dermocratic Values in CoNrEREcE oNr ScIENcE, PanosornY AND RELIGION 56,
58 (1942).
27. For development of these distinctions in detail see LAsswELL & KAPs.,z, Powzn
AND SocIm-Y cc. V, VIII (1950) ; McDougal, Law and Power, 46 Alm J. INrL L 102
(1952).
28. Malinowski, Introduction to HoOBiN, LAw AND ORDa I; POLYNESIA XXxi
(1934) urges students "never to forget the living, palpitating flesh and blood organism
of man which remains somewhere at the heart of every institution."
Similarly Radcliffe-Brown in his Preface to Fo=ms & Ev,,s-PiRtcuAD, AaIcA
PoLiTicAL SYszmzs mxiii (1940) offers, in a description of the "state," insights too often
forgotten: "In writings on political institutions there is a good deal of discussion about
the nature and the origin of the State, which is usually represented as being an entity
over and above the human individuals who make up a society, having as one of its attri-
butes something called 'sovereignty,' and sometimes spoken of as having a vill (law being
often defined as the will of the State) or as issuing commands. The State, in this sense,
does not exist in the phenomenal world; it is a fiction of the philosophers. What does
exist is an organization, i.e., a collection of individual human beings connected by a com-
plex system of relations. Within that organization different individuals have different roles,
and some are in possession of special power or authority, as chiefs or elders capable of
giving commands which will be obeyed, as legislators or judges, and so on. There is no
such thing as the power of the State; there are only, in reality, powers of individuals-
kings, .prime ministers, magistrates, policemen, party bosses, and voters. The political
1952]
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technical legal doctrines of a community represent reality or illusion may in
great measure depend upon the exact inter-relations of formal authority and
effective control .2  Thus, a constitutional prescription of doctrines for the
maintenance of civil liberties and an attempted balancing of power between
legislative, executive, and judicial institutions may succeed in a community
where effective control is widely dispersed but fail in a community where
legislative, executive, and judicial institutions remain subject to a concentrated
effective control that is hostile to civil liberties.30 Hence, comparative study
concerned for the realities of practice as -well as for myth must take into
account not only the structures and processes of formal authority but also
those of effective power, and of their interrelations.
The purposes that may move different observers to the comparative study
of decision-making processes are many and varied.3 1 Relatively recent surveys
include such itemizations as "the general purpose of any science; the search for
truth," increase in the understanding of the legal rules and institutions of
one's own country, increase in the understanding of foreign laws and of
assistance to practitioners, the unification of laws, increase in the understanding
of international law, improvement of legislative policy and definite legislative
purposes, "developing understanding of the role of law as a social institution,"
organization of a society is that aspect of the total organization which is concerned with
the control and regulation of the use of physical force. This, it is suggested, provides for
an objective study of human societies by the methods of natural science, the most satis-
factory definition of the special class of social phenomena to the investigation of which
this book is a contribution."
29. Cf. Stone, The End to be Served by Comparative Law, 25 TULAN. L. REV. 325,
332 (1951) : "We must study the history, the politics, the economics, the cultural back-
ground in literature and the arts, the religious beliefs and practices, the philosophies, If
we are to reach sound conclusions as to what is and what is not common." See also GuT-
TERiDGF, COMPRATIVE LAW 174 (2d ed. 1949).
30. An illustration borrowed from a lecture by Professor Franz Neumann.
31. The literature upon the purposes of comparative study is voluminous. In addition
to the articles already cited, the following items are among the many that deserve atten-
tion: GuTEIDXE, COMPARATIVE LAW C. I (2d ed. 1949); DAVID, TRAITE EILLMENnTAIR
DE DROIr CIVIL Co e.Pa 1-214 (1950) ; III WGMORE, PANORAMA OF TUE WORLD'S LEoAL
SYsTEMs 1119 (1928); SCHLESINGER, COMPARATIVE LAW CASES AND MATERIALS 8
(1950) ; II BRYcF, STUDIES IN HISTORY AND JURISPRUDENCE 607, 619 (1901); PoLLocx,
THE HISTORY OF COMPARAATIVE JURISPRUDENCE, 5 J. Comp. LEG. 74 (1903);
II VINOGRADOFF, COLLECTED PAPERS (1928) (various essays on jurisprudence) ; Houptu,
FUNDAMENTAL LEGAL CoNczErIoNs 340 (Cook ed. 1923); Ehrlich, Comparative Public
Law and the Fundamentals of Its Study, 21 COL. L. REv. 623 (1921) ; Hazeltine, The
Study of Comparative Legal History, 1927 J. Soc. PUnLIC TEAcnERs OF LAW 27; Esarra,
The Aims of Comparative Law, 7 TEMP. L. Q. 296 (1933); Lambert, Comparative Law
in 4 ENcYc. Soc. Sci. 126 (1937) ; Cohn, Task and Organization of Comparative Juris-
prudence, 51 JuRm. REv. 134 (1939) ; Friedmann, A Comparative Law Course at Melbournle
University, 1 J. Soc. PUBLIC TzACHERS OF LAW 274 (N.S. 1949); Lawson, The Field of
Comparative Law, 61 JuRmh. REv. 16 (1949); Auld, Methods of Consparative Jurispru-
dence, 8 U. oF TORONTO L. J. 83 (1949) ; Hazard, UNESCO and the Law, 4 lIcoi, 291
(1949) ; Dainow, Teaching Methods for Comparative Law, 3 J. OF LEGAL Eu. 388 (191).
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decreasing the exercise of arbitrary power and increasing the rule of law, and
"the instilling of values."132 It is believed, however, that there is today, for
scholars who demand and share responsibility for the values of a free society,
one central purpose which can unify and revivify all these other purposes.
Most broadly conceived, that central, over-riding purpose is, in accord with
the opportunity and need we have urged above, the clarification for all our
communities-from local through national and regional to global--of the
perspectives, the conditions, and the alternatives that are today necessary
for securing, maintaining, and enhancing basic democratic values in a peaceful
world.33
The potentialities of the comparative method for value clarification at dif-
ferent community levels have just begun to be demonstrated. 4 Enough
creative comparative studies have been made, however, to suggest that the
method can be used to clarify the values of the peoples of the world, not for
simple verbal unification or for promoting any particular world organization,
but rather for demonstrating the deep underlying equivalences in their de-
mands for the values of a free society, for reinforcing their expectations that
they can best maximize their own individual values in such society, for
cementing their loyalties to such society, for increasing the identifications of
all free peoples with each other, and for in general establishing the consensus
and predispositions necessary to effective cooperation in whatever forms of
organization may be most appropriate under contemporary conditions.35 It
32. These itemizations are taken by random sampling from Rheinstein, Tcacling
Comparative Law, 5 U. OF CH. L REv. 615 (1938) ; Hazard, Comparative Law in Legal
Education, IS U. OF CHL L. REv. 264 (1951) ; Stevenson, Comparative and Foreign Law
in.American Law Schools, 50 COL L REv. 614 (1950) ; III Yntema, Roman Low as the Basis
of Comparative Law in 2 LAw : A CENTURY OF Proonss 346 (1937) ; and F. Stone, End
to be Served by Comparative Law, 25 TuLANn L REv. 325 (1951).
33. Cf. Riesenfeld, Book Review, 3 J. LEGAL ED. 620 (1951) ; Sayre, Book Review,
36 IowA L. REv. 585 (1951); Sturges, The Quest for World Law and Order, 22 TtLA".E
L. REv. 558 (1948); Hazard, supra note 32; and LEIaGiToN, HvuLmiz RELATwNos I= A
CHANGING VORLD 101 (1949).
34. The most significant and dramatic demonstration has been in the United Nations
Human Rights program. For introduction, see LAUTrnPAcHT, I N TRNATioNAL LAw A=D
Hua-fAN RIGH3TS (1950); Robertson, The European Convention for the Protection of
Human Rights, 27 Bair. Y.B. INT'L. L. 145 (1950).
35. The theme is developed in McDougal & Leighton, The Rights of Man in 1lle
World Community: Constitutional Illtsions verss Rational Action, 59 YA.E L. J. 60,
108 (1949).
The possibilities of discovering deep underlying equivalences in values, despite dif-
ferences in institutional doctrines and practices, are emphasized by many observers. See,
for examples, Murdock, The Common Denominator of Cultures in THE SCI Eca o7 MAN
I2 THE WORLD Ciss 123 (Linton ed. 1945) and LEIGHToN, Huaur= Rza.Aro.s n: A
CHANGING WoRa 161, 162 (1949) : "Related to the lack of a functional view of human
affairs is a difficulty in seeing common qualities and common dynamic patterns when they
appear in widely different contexts, or in strikingly different shapes. If one does not think
in functional terms, it necessarily follows that he will not perceive' how functions exist
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has already been sufficiently urged that the method is indispensable to under-
standing of the world power process and the various component processes
that condition every measure, external or internal, cooperative or unilateral,
in every community. Certainly no other method promises more in the invention
and adaptation of felicitous alternatives, doctrines and procedures, for the
achievement of our emerging goals, whether world, regional, national, or
local.8 6
For achieving its central and other important purposes, it will be essential
for comparative study to discover and apply both a comprehensive guiding
theory and the techniques adequate to describing comparable decisions through
time and across political boundaries. The comprehensive guiding theory that
is necessary must permit, and require, an investigator to categorize the facts
to which decision-makers respond in terms of value changes (as contrasted
with doctrinal technicalities) which transcend the peculiarities of national or
regional institutional practice; to take into account all the important variables
that affect decision and to clarify the doctrinal variables, and the predis-
positions that decision-makers bring to decision, in terms of the basic in-
dividual and community values sought; to make precise description of the
trend of decisions through time and to appraise the impact of different tech-
nical doctrines among other variables in conditioning different decisions; to
identify in detail the community values in fact at stake in a flow of decisions
and to assess the compatibility of alternative decisions with values so clari-
fied; and, finally, creatively to explore the whole range of alternatives, in both
doctrine and institution, that may be adopted or invented for maximizing
decisions in accordance with community values under the given conditions.87
Specific techniques in the application of this guiding theory must, drawing
like recurrent themes in an enormous variety of different situations. Non-scientific think-
ing tends to generalize on the basis of gross similarities and differences of structure, not
on similarities and differences of dynamic process....
"It seems impossible that a jelly-fish and a man can have the same ground plan, so
great is their difference in appearance; yet they share metabolism, growth, reproduction,
respiration, irritability, and much else."
For expressions of the possible range of legal equivalences see Rheinstein, Book
Review, 64 HAav. L. REv. 1387 (1951); Neumann, Book Review, 64 PoT.. Sc. Q. 127
(1949) (indicating a certain lack of originality in Soviet law) ; Kahn-Freund, Int roduc-
tion to RENNER, THE INSTITUTIONS OF PmivATE LAW AND THEIR SOCIAL FUNCTION
(Kahn-Freund ed. 1949) ; Jackson, Sonw Problems in Developing an International Legal
System, 22 Tzimue. L. Q. 147 (1948); EDER, A COMPARATIVE SURVEY OF ANGLO-AMECANm
AND LAT N-AmERICAN LAW 4 (1950); and Friedmann, A Re-Examination of the Rela-
tions between English, American and Continental Jurisprudence, 20 CAR'. B. REV. 175
(1942).
36. Hug, The History of Comparative Law, 45 H.Av. L. Rzv. 1027 (1932) offers
some indication of the tremendous diffusion of legal techniques in various epochs. A help-
ful recent contribution is Lenhoff, America's Legal Inventions Adopted in other Countries,
1 BUFFALO L REv. 118 (1951).
37. These are the indispensable procedures in a "policy oriented" approach to any
legal study. LASSWELL & McDOUGAL, SYLLABUS, LAW, ScIENcE, AND POLICY (1950).
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upon all the insights and skills of contemporary scientific study of culture s
and personality,39 be adequate for performance of all the indicated tasks.
It is not our pretension that we can here proffer theory and techniques
of the necessary perfection. Their discovery or invention will require long
work by appropriate specialists. It is believed, however, that a beginning
contribution can be made to one possible, over-all organization of comparative
studies which might enable scholars, with requisite skills and resources, to
produce some of the information so urgently needed today.
The prime need is for an organization of studies which will permit the
location of any particular decisions being compared in a context which will
reveal the degrees of their equivalence or non-equivalence in effects on
values 40 The organization we propose is, therefore, explicitly oriented to
38. TH PoLICY Scmxrcas (Lerner & Lasswell eds. 1951) offers survey and biblio-
graphy of recent studies. See also LAsswEu., LERER & RoTrmm, THE CouwpPAvzvn
SrUY OF EuTs (1952); LAsswmEL, LmURa, & POOL, THE CoMARTIVE STUDY oF
Sy,-ors (1952) ; and LA swE.LL, I.rrzs, & AssocIA's, LANGUAGE OF PoIrrIcs (1949).
The rich insights of Malinowski remain largely unused by legal scholars. See Mali-
nowski, A ScirNTxmc THEORy or CULTURE AND OTHER ESSAYS (1944); THm Dyvi.-mCs
oF CULTRuAL CHANGE (1945); Introduction to HOGBiN, LAW AND Ona- IN POLY-
NEsiA (1934); A New Instrument for the Interpretation of L,--Eszcially Prim trite,
51 YALE LJ. 1237 (1942); 1 CORAL GARDNs AND THEIR MAGIc C. XI (1935); CRME
AND CusTOM IN SAVAGE Socmry (1926). Other recent books rich in suggestion are
ML-RocK, SocIAL STaucTru (1949) ; KLUCKHOHN, .MoAoR FORMAN (1949) ; and MzmN1k ,
SocrA THEORY AND SocIAL STaucrUR (1949).
Significant studies more directly related to power processes are UNESCO, Cot:-
TEMP'ORARY POLrrCAL ScIENCE: A SuRVEY OF MErHODS, REsnnc=H AND TAcHING-G
(1950); TImASHEFF, Ax INTRODUcrION TO THE SOCIOLOGY OF LAW (1939); RuscHE
& KImcEHEIMa , PUNISHMENT AND SocIAL GRowTH (1939); MAcIvzu, THE WED op
GowRmNMxT (1947); MERRIAm, SYSTEMATIC POLTIcs (1945); MfoscA, THE RULING
CLAsS (Livingston ed. 1939).
Widely heralded recent books such as ToweNAo A GENERAL THEORY OF AcTron (Par-
sons & Shils eds. 1951) and PARsoNS, THE SOCIAL SYsTEM (1951) seem to lack sufficient
orientation in power processes and to take too little account of predispositional variables
to be of direct use to legal scholars. Professor M. J. Levy, Jr. of Princeton will publish
in the summer of 1952 a book, THE STaucruRE o SocIErY, which will explicitly apply
the same general approach to the comparative study of societies.
39. Introduction to a vast literature may be obtained through DOLLARD & MILLE-,
PERSONALITY AND PSYCHOTHERAPY (1950); MONEY-KRLE, PSYCHOANALY Is ANm Pou-
Tics (1951); PERSONALITY AND POLrIICAL CRIsIs (Stanton & Perry eds. 1951); Kn-
DINER AND AssocATs, THE INDIVIDUAL AND HIS SOCIETY (1939); and THE PSYCHO-
LOGICAL FRoNTIEms OF Socrry (1945); KARDiNER, THE MARX oF OPPcssION c. II
(1951); ALERANDER, OuR AGE OF UNREASON (Rev. ed. 1951); FLUGEL, MAN , MORALS
AND SocIETY (1945) ; and WEST, CONsCIENCE AND SOCIETY (1945).
40. Dean Pound's theory of "interests" could serve this purpose if appropriate opera-
tional indices were supplied for each interest and the Various interests were explicitly
related to the predispositions of decision-makers. See Pound, A Survey of Social Interests,
57 HoAjr. L. REv. 1 (1943); J. STONE, THE PROVINCE AND FUNCTION OF LAW cc. XX-
XXII (1946). Without such amplification, the theory leaves obscure what is being com-
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values and seeks to relate all decisions in a hierarchy of power processes to
the values they affect.41 It assumes that the value-shaping processes in any
community, however limited or inclusive in time and space, can be con-
veniently described in terms of interdependent value-variables and institutions.
In terms of value-variables one may describe a community process as people
using such values as power, respect, enlightenment, wealth, well-being (in-
cluding safety, health, character, comfort), rectitude, skill, and affection as
bases to effect desired distributions of these same values among themselves
and others. Institutions are the patterns of practices, the myths and techniques,
the doctrines and procedures, by which such distributions are effected and
may of course, vary in infinite detail from community to community! 2 Fruit-
ful comparisons become possible when basic values are clarified and the in-
finite variety of institutional detail is appraised in terms of its effects on
such values.4 3 For comparisons either as between communities or in a single
community through time, the important general questions are: what are the
structures and processes, the doctrines and practices, by which each value is
shaped and shared, and what are the effects of these structures and processes,
these doctrines and practices, on each other value? With respect to each
value, in detail, what are the degrees of equivalency or difference in doctrine,
and in technical procedures? Thus, one may ask of any community or of a
pared, how the comparison is made, and by what criteria results are appraised. These
consequences are apparent, despite a fascinating collection of materials, in SimpsoN & J.
STONE, CASES AND READINGS ON LAW AND SOCIETY (3 Vol. 1948-49). See McDougal,
Book Review, 45 Am. J. INT'L. L. 399 (1951) and the earlier indication of the difficulties
in Dean Pound's theory in Lepaulle, The Function of Comparative Law, 35 HARv. L. Rv.
838 (1922).
41. The writer some years ago projected a more ambitious outline in collaboration
with Dr. Karl Graf, of Switzerland, and what is presented here draws in some measure
on the earlier collaborative work.
42. More detail on this type of analysis appears in LAsswE. & KAPLAN, PoWER AND
SocIary (1950).
The UNESCO volume on CONTEMPORARY POLITICAL SCIENCE (1950) offers few alter-
natives. In an essay on The Methods of Political Science, Chiefly in the United States
(at page 77), Cook writes: "Here I wish only to urge that possibly adequate classifications
may rest on major human motivations, or human needs (the two are not identical), if
these can be adequately separated, for postulational and observational-experimental pur-
poses, or as major, permanent, and virtually omnipresent institutions."
43. Bodenheimer, Book Review, 3 STAN. L. REv. 755 (1951) graphically depicts a
dilemma of "the Scylla of over-generalization" and "the Charybdis of exaggerated special-
ization." He writes: "If the .teacher chooses the method of selecting some specific and
narrow topics... he is in danger of losing himself in details and fostering in his students
a type of specialized thinking apt to mistake the trees for the forest. If, on the other hand,
he is inclined to paint with a wide brush, and to indulge in broad generalities regarding
the basic differences or similarities between the world's legal systems, he takes the risk
of giving an oversimplified and faulty picture."
Fulda, Book Review, 36 CORNELL L. Q. 185 (1950) wisely insists: "Without some
fundamental philosophy which brushes aside millions of details the value of comparative
law as a subject of organized study would remain obscure."
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series of communities: What are the power structures and processes of this
community? What are the roles of particular doctrines and practices in the
shaping and sharing of power? What are the effects of these structures and
processes, these doctrines and practices, on the shaping and sharing of all
other values? What are the wealth structures and processes? What, again,
are the roles of particular doctrines and practices and what are the conse-
quences of the processes as a whole for all other values? And so on for each
important value in the community or communities under study.44
An outline, though brief and at highest level abstraction, may make clearer
the type of over-all organization of studies we suggest. Under the four main
headings of Power Processes, Value Processes, Private Associations, and
Policy Procedures, and with more or less impressionistic indication of the
structure and type of inquiry under each heading, the outline follows.
Powa PROCESSES
I. Global.
A comprehensive picture of the world power process must identify the
participants and describe the interactions in which they influence each other,
the bases of their power (in control over people, values, institutions), the
practices they engage in (ranging from volition-procedures to coercion), and
the effects they get (in control over people, values, institutions).5 Nation-
states are still by far the most influential participants in this process and
most of the important decisions in application of the doctrines of traditional
public and private international laws as well as of municipal doctrine are made
by officials deriving authority from nation-states.4 0 Inquiries that would reveal
relevant predispositions and practices about the globe might be organized
as follows:
A. Interactiois.47 For the admission of new groups to the formal processes
of international law and organization, nation-states have evolved a curious
44. RIESENFELD & MA.jxw.L, MODE=x SocIAL LrGiSLT-o:N (1950) which is organ-
ized about the value we would describe as "well-being" indicates the potentialities of a
value by value analysis.
45. McDouGAL, LAsswELz, & LEIGHTON, SYULABUs, Wonw Co-UzN T AIM LAw:
A CoNTmPORARY INTERNATIONAL LA,' (1950) presents a detailed outline with bibliog-
raphy.
46. Cf. Niemeyer, Book Review, 4 Wonm PoLrnics 2P- (1952): "We need to say
and repeat often that the essential prerequisites for a society, a monopoly of force and a
broad consensus about the uses of such centralized force, do not edst on a world scale.
This means that any rational approach to the problem of international order must take
fully into account the edstence of a multitude of centers, each capable of exercising a
certain amount of ordering functions. The play of forces among these centers, the stability
of their positions, and their power relative to each other are phenomena of fundamental
importance to the problem of international order."
47. For sake of brevity and special relevance to comparative study the general analysis
is here somewhat abbreviated. A more comprehensive outline appears below with respect
to the National Power Process.
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ceremony called "recognition." The granting or withholding of this ceremony,
with its attendant benefits in diplomatic intercourse and access to formal
power, is used by each state against new groups as an instrument for im-
proving its own power, and other value, position. The important questions
are: who within any given nation-state is authorized to bestow recognition
on another body politic; by what standards in international and national
policies does the recognizing official act; by what formalities is the ceremony
effected; what are the consequences in terms of access to formal authority
and other values of recognition as between nation-states and with respect to
the claims of private individuals; what meaning, if any, in terms of such con-
sequences can be given to traditional distinctions between recognition de jure
and de facto, recognition of governments and states, and conditional and
unconditional recognition ?
B. Bases of Power. The effective power of a nation-state is determined,
not only by resources and geographical position, but also by its practices in
controlling people and resources and the efficiency of its organization for
internal and external purposes. People are controlled by selective admissions
and expulsions, by differential admission to citizenship and to the various
value processes (discriminations against minorities on grounds of race, color,
alienage, opinion, etc.), and by the systematic positive use of various values
to secure conforming behavior (treason, espionage, sabotage, military service,
compulsory labor, compulsory indoctrination, control of weapons, and so on).
Non-governmental groups such as political parties, pressure groups, and
private associations are managed with varying degrees of encouragement,
regulation, policing or suppression. Resources and wealth processes, including
the functions of allocation, planning, development, production, and distri-
bution, are controlled in a wide range of practices between the polar extremes
of regulated private enterprise and complete governmentalization. The effi-
ciency of internal institutions in mobilizing manpower and resources into an
effective military establishment, the degrees of independence, in formal
authority and fact, from other power units, and the forms of alliance with
other power units, 'for the positive support of policies, vary greatly from
nation-state to nation-state. Comparative study of all these variations in bases
of effective power could contribute much more to real understanding of the
world power process than the customary reiteration of the doctrines of public
international law about dual nationality, acquisition and loss of territory, and
sovereignty.
C. Practices. The practices by which nation-states engage each other
range between the polar extremes of peaceful procedures and war, and present
a continuous process of attack and defense by all weapons, diplomatic, ideolo-
gical, economic, and military. The important question for comparative study
is, in general, how the foreign affairs power is structured, and operates, in
different states. What is the structure of formal authority (constitutional
pattern; division of powers between executive, legislative, and judicial insti.
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tutions; division, if any, between national government and internal units)
and what is the structure of effective controls (who actually makes the
decisions and subject to what pressures)? How do structure and oppration
in any given state compare with that in others when measured by such
criteria as democracy (widely shared power), efficiency (quickness, flexi-
bility, rationality in respect to values), representativeness of national interest,
responsibility to other nation-states, and maintenance of civilian supremacy?
What, in detail, is the constitutional competence to negotiate and conclude
international agreements, how are such agreements made internally binding
within the nation-state, by what criteria do officials interpret such agreements,
and by what criteria and procedures are they terminated, internally and in-
ternationally? Where, in further detail, is the war power located, what is its
scope, and to what, if any, commitments does the nation-state subscribe for
the initiation and conduct of hostilities? Enough studies have been made to
indicate the rich supplementation that might be added to the doctrines of
public international law.
48
D. Effects. The effects that a nation-state achieves, from its bases of
power and by its practices, in terms of control over people and resources
embrace all of the problems of the field of Private International Law as
traditionally conceived.4 9 The most general question is over what events
(value changes) a nation-state will exercise its power to effect its om policies
and with respect to what ev.ents will it limit its exercise of power in expecta-
tion of similar reciprocity in self-restraint by decision-makers in other nation-
states. In specific controversies some one nation-state has effective control
over persons or resources which it can use as a base for power and the issue
is whether it should exercise its power to make its own policy for the events
under review, or whether, out of deference to its own long term interests or
to the interests of other states or to a regional or world community interest,
it should dispose of the controversy either by refusing to exercise its power
or by applying policy formulated by another state. For resolution of contro-
versies of this kind, decision-makers have customarily invoked as justifications
for decision certain mystical notions of "jurisdiction," "territoriality," "nation-
ality," "domicile" and the like, and reified derivations from "contract," "prop-
erty," ".tort," "crime," and so on, all of which made a confused reference at one
and the same time to facts, policies, and official responses to facts. The whole
body of doctrine is more than ordinarily nebulous and confused. Rational inquiry
48. For examples, see PREuss, THE EXECurIoN OF TREATY OBLIGATIo0S TinnoGH
INTERNAL LAw-SYsTEm OF THE UNITED STATES AND OF SoUxn OTHER CouiMEs, PnO-
CEEDINGS OF THE AmmumIcAx Socixrv or INTERNATIONAL LAW 82 (1951) and The Rlation
of International Law to thw Internzal Law in the Fronch Consliulional System, 44 A.
J. INT' L. 641 (1950); Deener, International Law Prozisions in Post-World Var II
Constitutions, 36 CoR.,m.L L. Q. 505 (1951).
49. The fruitfulness of comparatihe study has been superbly demonstratcd b Pro.
fessor Rabel's monumental work. RABEL, THE COxFLCr OF LAWS: A CO.uTPARA-.TI% SriTUt
(3 Vol 1945-50).
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must begin by differentiating controversies in terms of significant differences
in fact: who the parties are, nation-state versus individual, individual versus
individual, national or non-national, corporate or non-corporate; what values
(power, wealth, etc.) are at stake for the parties, for the nation-state of the
decision-maker, for other nation-states, for regional groupings, and for the
world community; whether the value changes contested took place by agree-
ment or deprivation, volition or coercion ("contract," "tort," "crime," "expro-
priation," etc.) ; the locus of each significant event in the value changes con-
tested (within the territory of the decision-maker, within the territory of
others, on the high seas, etc.) and the territorial range of the effects of such
events; the locus of any resource affected and the type of resource (land,
obligations, ships, etc.) ; the types of "acts of state"-legislative, executive, or
judicial-that have occurred in nation-states other than that of the decision-
maker; whether the nation-state of the decision-maker has "recognized" the
other nation-state purporting to declare policy for the events in question;
and so on.50 With types of controversies so differentiated, comparative survey
of how decision-makers located in different nation-states apply traditional
technical doctrines to different controversies might permit effective appraisal
of such doctrines in terms of their consequences for the values of all interested
parties. It has long been demonstrated that "territorial" notions of jurisdic-
tion are largely outmoded, that too much emphasis upon the physical locus
of an event is irrational because what matters to individual citizens as well
as to nation-states is not simply where an event takes place but the total effect
on values.51 The task of constructing a new and rational doctrine to take
the place of the outmoded remains, however, a challenge to the comparative
study of Private International Law.
II. National.
The power process of any particular nation-state operates within the context
of the world power process and both affects and is affected by the larger con-
text.52 Above, our principal concern was for effects upon the world process.
Here our concern must include as well effects upon the distribution of values
within the nation-state. Comprehensive study must again identify participants
and describe arenas of interaction and influence, methods of access or ad-
mission to such arenas, bases of power, practices, and effects. Participants
may be conveniently categorized as government, political parties, pressure
groups, private associations, and individuals. Government refers to the officials
established by formal authority and who are expected to make the important
50. The beginnings of such an approach are illustrated in SALONGA, PRIVATE INTrR-
NATIONAL LAW (1950) (supplement I). Professor C. J. Olmstead, of New York Univer-
sity Law School, has in preparation a more detailed outline.
51. Coox, THE LOGICAL AND LEAL BASES OF THE CONFLIcr oF LAWS (1942).
52. A more detailed and illustrated outline has been prepared by the writer and Mr.
Edward McWhinney of Australia.
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decisions sustained by community coercion, political parties to groups who
present candidates and platforms at elections, pressure groups to organizations
primarily devoted to the manipulation of government and political parties,
and private associations to groups primarily designed for the shaping and
sharing of values other than power but which seek power effects. Individuals
act in both organized and unorganized ways. In any nation-state power pro-
cesses affect other value processes (wealth, enlightenment, respect, etc.) and
other value processes in turn affect the power processes. Hence description
may conveniently begin with the broad outlines of power processes and then
develop, in spiral fashion, the details of doctrine and practice in more precise
description of the role and effects of power in each of the other value pro-
cesses. Relevant comparative inquiry into the broad outlines of power might,
beginning with government, proceed as follows:
A. Arenas. The call here is for the interactions in which power is shaped
and shared and these may be described in terms of the interrelation of decision-
makers in conventional institutional structures-constituent or amending,
legislative, executive, administrative, judicial-and in effective control groups.
B. Admission. The question is how officials obtain access to positions of
power and all qualifications, elections, and appointment practices are relevant.
C. Bases of Power. The general inquiry is how formal authority, to invoke
and apply community coercion, is divided among officials. Divisions may be
made between the delusively functional institutions-legislative, executive,
administrative, judicial--or geographically (with varying degrees of centrali-
zation or "federalism") between national and provincial or local authorities.
Comprehensive survey and comparison require a precise indication of exactly
what powers are granted to what officials, over whom, with respect to what
values, and subject to what conditions or limitations. Formal authority and
other factors may of course invest officials with effective control over violence,
resources, enlightenment, and other values, and the varying degrees of such
control are unquestionably of the greatest significance to fruitful comparative
study. Degrees of effective control may perhaps, however, be more easily
appraised after completion of other inquiries.
D. Practices. The practices by which officials participate in the shaping
and sharing range from the maintenance by coercion of a framework of order
to the direct provision of goods and services. The framework of order is
designed to secure within the limits of community policy the expectations
created by private agreement and volition, to protect varying degrees of pri-
vate control over resources, to insure individuals against arbitrary depriva-
tions, and to maintain conformity with certain standards of rectitude in be-
havior. Both the maintenance of a framework of order and the direct pro-
vision of goods and services require the formation and application of policy
in a series of steps ranging through the collection of intelligence, the clarifi-
cation and recommendation of proposals, authoritative enactment or pre-
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scription, invocation, interpretation, application in specific instances, and
termination. The task of comparative study is to expose how these different
functions are performed in different nation-states and to appraise differences
in performance.
E. Effects. The effects that officials achieve by their practices require
appraisal not only in terms of the degree to which power is shared but also
in terms of consequences for the distribution of each major community value.
Hence detailed appraisal requires more specific investigation (outlined below)
with respect to each value.
Delineation of the varying rules of political parties, pressure groups, private
associations, and individuals requires the asking and answering of the same
fundamental questions, appropriately modified, as to arenas, admission, bases
of power, practices, and effects. The importance for comparative study of party
systems, pressure group operations, private association controls, and individual
powers and freedom may safely here be assumed.
Building upon this broad description of power processes, more intensive
exploration of the special role and effects of power in each of the other value
processes, and 6f the reciprocal impacts of the various value processes, can
seek amplification and detailed elaboration of bases of power, practices, and
effects with respect to each major value. For systematic survey and comparison
we suggest for each value (wealth, enlightenment, etc.) an outline as follows:
A. Bases of Power.
1. Formal Authority.
(a) Affirmative Powers. The explicit grants of formal authority to
government officials that may be used to affect the distribution of the
value under study.
(b) Limitations. The constitutional provisions of doctrines purporting
to restrict official power which may be invoked to limit or control the
exercise of the powers indicated above.
2. Effective Controls. The structure of political parties, pressure groups,
private associations, and unorganized individual activities, with controls
over various base values, that conditions the application of both powers
and limitations.
B. Practices. The flow of decisions that in fact effects the shaping and
distribution of the value.
1. Formal authority. The official decisions applying powers and limita-
tions ii shaping and distributing the value.
2. Effective controls. The details of how the non-governmental partici-
pants bring their influence to bear on particular decisions.
C. Effects. Final summary of the distribution of the value among the
members of the community in consequence of the practices above and on
appraisal of impacts upon the distribution of other values.
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III. Local.
Exactly the same analysis can be applied to local or provincial power
processes with appropriate modification of the detailed questions,3 The great
range of intergovernmental relations that affect local decisions increases the
elaborateness of the inquiry into arenas and admissions. The vide variety
of general function and special function units and the varying sources of
authority in constitutions and from higher levels of government add to the
complexity of bases of power. Frequent obliteration of the lines between the
conventional institutions of higher levels of government (legislative, executive,
etc.) makes even more important the careful specification of functions in
describing practices. Effects are sometimes difficult to trace because of the
fuzzy hierarchy of responsibility and the impact of many decisions. The
fundamental inquiries are, however, comparable and the potentialities of
comparative study for understanding and policy guidance are no less. Consider,
for example, what careful comparative study in various countries of one
principal local problem, the establishment and maintenance of an efficient
physical environment, might reveal. A pooling of experience and the best
contemporary wisdom about such functions as the control of community
design, the regulation of land use, the provision of public services, securing
improvements and development, policing, quality in construction and main-
tenance, protecting consumers against price gouging, and the administration
of public controls, might lead to improvements everywhere in the perform-
ance of such functions.
5 4
VALUE PRocEssEs: AGREEMENTS AND DEPRIvATIONS
Working within a context of broadly described power processes, compre-
hensive comparative study must next examine the details of how community
coercion is employed in different nation-states to channel and control the
agreements and deprivations by which individuals shape and share values in
community life. Choice of a principle of organization can be made from a
number of alternatives. The traditional principle, as we have seen, is that
of legal technicality which may not sufficiently transcend national peculiarities
and which commonly makes confused reference simultaneously and without
discrimination to the value changes to which decision-makers are respond-
ing, to the policies by which they justify decisions, and to the decisions that
are made. Almost any alternative would seem preferable. One possible alter-
53. A detailed outline has been prepared by Professor W. T. Mallison, Jr., at the
George Washington Law School. Our intent in the text here is to present only enough
comment to indicate that the same type of analysis is applicable to any power structure
at any areal or regional level.
54. For detailed organization with respect to these problems, see MCDOUGAL &
H&ABm, PRopEzay, WEALTH, LAND: ALocAxN, PLANNiNG A.n DEOP.MNT C. IX
(1948).
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native would be an organization value by value in which each value (wealth,
enlightenment, and so on) is taken separately for comprehensive and integrated
investigation of the various doctrines and practices by which the community
controls both agreements and deprivations with respect to that value. An
alternative less disturbing to conventional legal predispositions is perhaps
to organize by agreements and deprivations, but with the detailed location
of both agreements and deprivations in value and institutional context. So
long as all variables significant for the effective study of factors affecting
decisions, of the consequences of decisions, and of the clarification of com-
munity policies are kept explicitly in focus and are not confused, the exact
principle of organization is not too important. The mode of organization
which we will indicate by brief comment begins, accordingly, with agreements
and deprivations, and seeks to add necessary value and institutional orienta-
tion.
In a society aspiring to be free the principal mode of shaping and sharing
values is by agreement, in the broad sense of volition. Simple deference to
human dignity requires that respect be given to individual volition to the
extent that it can be kept compatible with over-all community policies in
securing and preserving basic values for all members. The generalized task
of the "law of contracts" is to establish both a framework within which
individuals by their own initiative and agreement can shape and share values
and certain limits beyond which volition cannot transgress upon community
policies. The two most important questions for comparative study are: To
what degree with respect to what values (power, 5 wealth, enlightenment, etc.)
in what varying institutional contexts does this community give effect to
private agreement? By what doctrines and practices does this community
unity seek to make private agreement effective to this degree in this context?
More detailed inquiry requires specification of how certain functions are
performed. These may be itemized briefly as:
Fixing Policy Limits. Determining whether a particular agreement in its
context is within or contrary to over-all community policies. Agreements
for race discrimination, for buying or selling public offices, or for locking up
resources from use, may be denied community protection without further
consideration.
Securing Intent. Making certain that there is a final expression of intent,
an agreement, or behavior that should be regarded as raising expectations
in others that a commitment has been made. This is the function that tradi-
tional doctrines about offer and acceptance, writing and seal, parol evidence
rule, consideration, mistake, duress, fraud, conditions, competence of parties,
illusory promises, and their equivalents are designed to serve.
55. Even though power processes have already been broadly described, it is necessary
to continue to work with power in order to secure more and more detail of the interrela-
tions with other values and institutional practices. One is reminded of Maitland's meta-
phor of the "seamless web."
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Enforcement. The use of community coercion to make certain that the
promised expectations actually are forthcoming or that appropriate redress
is made. This is the function of the traditional remedies, such as damages,
specific performance, injunction, imprisonment. The principal question is
what remedy in this context of value and institution is the most economical
in securing the most efficient operation of private agreement to the extent
preferred.
Protecting against Third Parties. Preventing third parties from interfer-
ing with promised expectations or from taking the benefits of agreements
without appropriate assumption of burdens.
Honoring Transfer of Benefits. Determining conditions under which
promises may transfer benefits of agreements to others.
Construction. Determining the relations of the parties with respect to
exigencies they did not foresee or foresaw only vaguely.
Termination. Putting an end to the agreement when it has served its
purposes or when, though lawful in the beginning, it has become inimical to
community policy.
Subjection to Community Claims. The imposition of appropriate com-
munity burdens in the form of taxation, eminent domain and exercises of
the police power.
It is reasonably obvious that with respect to all these functions both com-
munity policies and the responses of decision-makers will vary with the
values primarily and secondarily at stake and with the priorities ascribed
to such values in varying institutional contexts. Hence any significant com-
parative study of how these functions are performed in different communities
must make cross-categorizations in terms both of the values affected and of
an infinite variety of institutional context, such as the resource being used,
the presence or absence of competition, and effects on consumers, or of in
general such varying details as appear in the contexts of insurance, con-
struction, manufacturing, banking, labor, and so on. 0
The kind of specification of context that is necessary, if comparative study
of doctrines and practices about agreements is to be made fruitful, may
perhaps be indicated by reference to certain agreements and expressions of
intent which explicitly concern resources. For the parties to such agreements
wealth is commonly the value primarily at stake, but other values may be
involved and the degree of their involvement may make a difference to decision
and to policy. Thus, with respect to agreements or expressions of intent
which seek merely to transfer claims to resources from one party to another,
and which, in sum, effect a continuing allocation of the community's resources
among private users, the relevant inquiries must cover all the doctrines and
56. MUE.L.R, CONTRACr IN CONTE XT (1951) indicates the difficulties in focusing
traditional materials on one "long-term commercial project." KEssLrsa & SHAnP, CAsEs
ox CONxTRAcr (mimeo. 1950) offer a policy orientation, though somewhat less systematic
and comprehensive than we propose.
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practices by which community officials perform the various functions itemized
in the paragraph aboveY7 How are the agreements policed to insure that
their objectives are within community bounds? How are parties protected
from economic duress, onerous time stipulations, and other penalties? What
procedures are afforded for securing clear, comprehensive, and uncoerced
expressions of intent? How efficient is the public recording system designed
to afford protection against third parties? Is it comprehensive, conclusive,
and economically ordered? Does it enable promisors quickly and easily to
establish their claims, and promisees to know that they are getting what
they are promised? And so on.
With respect to agreements or intents that go beyond mere transfer and
seek to regulate future uses of resources or claims to wealth, which seek to
establish what is sometimes called "deadhand control," the inquiry becomes
more complex. 58 The objective of the parties in such transactions extend
beyond wealth effects to effects on all other values. Wealth objectives include
both care of dependents and successors and a wide variety of commercial
purposes. Non-wealth objectives range from community (promotion of edu-
cation, advancement of religion, improvement of government, relief of poverty,
promotion of health or patriotism, etc.) to private (preventing specified be-
havior-marrying, divorcing, drinking alcohol, gambling, etc.-by specified
persons, or obtaining specified behavior-care of tombstones, pet animals,
houses, etc.-from specified persons). The mode of restraint or deadhand
control attempted may include the devotion of a fund to specified purposes
in perpetuity or for a long period of time, shifts from one person or purpose
to another upon future events, ascertainment of beneficiaries only upon some
future event, restraints on the anticipation of income or principal, restraints
on the alienation of specific resources, the accumulation of income, and
restraints on management. The form of wealth may vary through all the
protean forms of "land" and funds. The management establishment may or
may not include persons entitled to beneficial enjoyment under the transfer.
The mode of establishment may be by corporate charter, by unadorned
agreement, or by "legal" or "equitable" property forms or other equivalents.
Transferors and transferees vary greatly in both value and institutional posi-
tion and in capacity to affect community values.
Significant comparative study must make allowance for all these and other
variables with appropriate precision in survey of how community coercion
is brought to bear in performance of all the separate functions itemized above.
The critical questions are, in brief, to what degree, for what length of time,
and by what modes will deadhand control be honored for the various pur-
poses in varying contexts, and what are their consequences, for all other
problems. Answer to these questions is obscured in Anglo-American countries
57. For more detail see McDoUGAL & HABER, PROPERTY, WEALTII, LAND: ALLoCA-
TION, PLANNING AND DMELOPMENT 113 ef seq. (1948).
58. Id. at 246.
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by the continued use of ancient doctrines which dichotomize "legal" and
"equitable" interests and classify "possessory estates" and "future interests"
by such temporally exotic terms as determinable fees and possibilities of
reverter, fees subject to condition subsequent and rights of entry, reversions,
vested and contingent remainders, executory interests, and so on. One task
of comparative study might be to determine whether this language serves
purposes other than of obfuscation.
With respect to agreements, for one final illustration, whose purpose is
primarily to plan or regulate land use among neighboring occupants, the
inquiry is scarcely less complex.59 The parties to such agreements may of
course seek simply efficient use as among themselves, but they may also seek
to strike directly against some basic value of the community, as by provisions
that resources shall be locked up or that premises can be occupied only under
conditions of race discrimination; or to interfere directly with specific com-
munity plan, as by restricting to residential purposes land marked out by the
community for business or manufacturing development; or to interfere with
the efficient operation of the community's planning process, as by providing
that specified land shall be used only for specified purposes, such as for
hitching racks or fish markets; or to bind land as security for personal grati-
fications not easily commutated in money, such as for the singing of songs
or the croaking of frogs; or to bind land to inefficient and outmoded practices
in use and development. The land affected may be located in rural or urban
areas and may be of many different forms (surface, air, light, water, minerals,
oil, sub-surface, etc.). The uses affected may cover the whole community
range: residential, productive, manufacturing, business, public service or
utility, or governmental. Durations specified for control may be permanent,
indefinite, for a definite period, or temporary. The number of users per-
mitted may include only specified parties or the public generally. The agree-
ment may be evidenced by non-verbal behavior, oral permission, action in
reliance, unsealed writing or sealed writing and may be in language of promise
or language of grant. The value and institutional positions of parties to agree-
ments may vary greatly. Comparative study must again take all these variables
into account if it would resolve the mysteries of easements, profits a prendre,
licenses, running covenants, equitable servitudes, and interests "in the nature
of" easements, and so on, and their foreign law equivalents, and seriously
attempt discovery and appraisal of the effects of differing doctrines and
practices.
For protecting their members against unauthorized deprivations, for main-
taining certain standards in expectation and behavior irrespective of individual
commitment, communities afford various procedures and remedies. When
the deprivations are of sufficiently great danger to community and individual
values, the violation of authoritative community standards sufficiently gross.
59. Id. at 475.
1952]
THE YALE LAW JOURNAL
the deprivations may be called "crimes" and the community may itself take
the initiative and impose upon offenders certain counter-deprivations of vary-
ing degrees of severity, commonly called criminal sanctions. When the depri-
vations are considered to involve less threat to community interest, they may
be termed "torts" or "delicts" or private wrongs, and initiative in invoking
measures of redress may be left to the injured parties or their representatives.
Effective comparative study of how officials make these decisions and afford
appropriate sanctions or remedies requires location, comparable to that sug-
gested for agreements, in value and institutional context.
With respect to deprivations regarded as "crimes," the relevant inquiries
may be indicated in broadest outline.00 What values in what institutional
contexts does each community under study protect by criminal sanctions?
Who in what value and institutional position is protected against whom in
what value and institutional position? How in detail are conventional "crimes"
related to the protection of particular values, such as power (treason, espio-
nage, sabotage, sedition), wealth (larceny, embezzlement, fraud), well-being
(homicide, assault, rape), respect (genocide, libel, peonage), rectitude (blas-
phemy, obscenity, polygamy), affection (adultery), skill (practicing pro-
fession without license), and enlightenment (failure to school children)?
How is the community organized to formulate and apply standards for pro-
tection from such deprivations? What are the special procedures for detec-
tion, apprehension, trial, and punishment? How in detail are standards
applied in fact through time? What standards, if any, over-ride all value
and institutional contexts and what are related to particular contexts and
types of deprivation? What defenses are permitted to offenders in various
contexts in terms of immunity for age or position, coercion, mistake, mental
or physical incapacity, entrapment, consent, former jeopardy, and so on?
What are the sanctions invoked against particular offenses and how are such
sanctions applied, administered, and terminated? What effects are achieved
by various criminal sanctions in terms of securing behavior patterns in accord
with established standards? What alternatives are there to such sanctions?
With respect to the deprivations regarded as "torts" or private wrongs,
the relevant inquiries are similar. What values in what institutional contexts
does each community protect by private remedies against deprivation? Who
is protected against whom and how? Again, in detail, are conventional "torts"
related to the protection of particular values, such as power (deprivations
of access to public office, voting, and effective control groups; improper
performance of official functions; false arrest or imprisonment), wealth
(trespass, nuisance, ultra-hazardous activities, interference with subjacent
or lateral support; conversion, negligence; unfair competition, unauthorized
60. For imaginative demonstration of the potentialities of a value oriented approach
see DESSION, CRIMINAL LAw ADMINISTRATION AND PUBLIC ORDER (1948). Professor
Dession is presently making wide comparative applications of his general analysis. See
Donnelly, The New Yugoslav Crimzial Code, 61 YALE L.J. 510 (1952).
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use of trade secrets, interference with contractual relations, misrepresentation;
discrimination in hiring, firing, or tenure or in access to labor organization),
well-being (assault and battery, malpractice, breach of statutory duty, negli-
gence, ultra-hazardous activity), respect (defamation, malicious prosecution,
invasion of privacy, denial of access to public utilities and institutions),
rectitude (denial of access to institutions of worship, defamation of religious
groups), affection (seduction, alienation of affections, interference with
family relations), skill (unauthorized use of trade secrets, denial of access
to professions or unions), enlightenment (denial of access to educational
facilities or channels of communication, misrepresentation)? How is the
community organized to establish and apply standards to such deprivations?
What in detail are the standards established and applied with respect to
particular deprivations? What distinctions are made betveen intended and
unintended harms, and ordinary and ultra-hazardous activities? What are
the doctrines with respect to breach of duty, causation, and matters of de-
fense? What particular remedies-compensatory damages, punitive damages,
injunction, restitution-are made available for redress of particular depri-
vations? How effectively do these remedies secure the established community
standards? What alternatives to such remedies are available in insurance
practices or public administration or other institutional forms?
PRIVATE AsSOCIATIONS
In describing power processes it is necessary to direct attention to private
associations in so far as such associations seek direct effects upon power.
There is, however, the further task of investigating community doctrines
and practices in promoting and regulating such associations for the primary
purposes they are designed to serve. For this investigation a convenient
division may be made of such associations in terms of primary purposes.
That division is between associations primarily devoted to the production
and sharing of wealth and those primarily devoted to other values. We
begin with the former.
I. Associations Devoted to the Production and Sharing of Wcalth.
In most general form the relevant inquiry is what forms of association are
afforded to whom for what detailed objectives by what methods and how
are activities policed in the interests of members and the community.0 1 In
common law countries the forms afforded include both unincorporated or-
ganizations (agencies, partnerships, joint stock companies, business trusts,
61. Though the associations under e.-mmination are labelled "private" to distinguish
them from associations directly concerned with power, the formulation of problems is
designed to permit comparison of associations in nativon-states of varying degrees of social-
ization. A more detailed outline has been prepared by Professor Angel C. Cruz of the
University of the Philippines.
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and such informal association as joint ventures, syndicates, and pools) and
incorporated organizations (closely or widely held, privately or publicly
financed). Detailed objectives of the parties include, in addition the pro-
duction of goods and services and the making of profits, the combining of
wealth and effort, limited liability and flexibility in financing, minimum
investment, transferability of interest, centralized management, and continuity
of existence. Methods of establishment range from private agreement and
declarations of trust through compliance with general statutory requirements
for organization or incorporation to special legislative franchise. Compre-
hensive description of how community coercion is brought to bear to promote
and police private association requires comparison and contrast of doctrines
and practices with respect to all forms of association in the handling of a
variety of distinguishable problems, such as (1) the formation of the parti-
cular association, (2) financing the enterprise and determining the distri-
bution of profits and losses, (3) management and operation, (4) termination,
and (5) subjection to community claims. The type of detail relevant under
each of these problem headings may with respect to incorporated organizations
be impressionistically indicated as follows: formation (the role of promoters,
brokers, underwriters; pre-incorporation agreements; de facto and de jure
corporations; the structure of the corporate constitution in articles of incor-
poration and by-laws), finance (assembling of assets, stock issues and funded
debts, redemption and retirement of shares; dividend policies; reductions and
increases of capital; regulation for protection of investors), management
(official structure and distribution of powers, corporate acts, fiduciary obli-
gations of officials, responsibilities to stockholders and others; stockholders'
powers, election of officers, derivative suits and other remedies; creditors'
powers; control techniques of various groups; impact of management policies
on workers and consumers), termination (sale of corporate assets, dissolu-
tion, merger and consolidation, reorganization), and subjection to community
claims (taxation, eminent domain, and regulation of businesses affected with
a public interest). The task of significant comparative study is to survey
the handling of these type problems for all forms of association in countries
of varying degrees of socialization and to appraise different forms, doctrines,
and practices in terms of their impact both on the production of goods and
services and on other basic community values.
II. Associations Devoted to Values Other than Wealth.
The general inquiry is again what forms of association are afforded to
whom for seeking what values and detailed objectives, and how does the
community promote and regulate such forms. Most contemporary communi-
ties afford forms of association for the shaping and sharing of a great
variety of values other than wealth. Among the more obvious itemizations
for several values are these: for enlightenment, educational institutions and
societies, scientific and research foundations, associations for specialized
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communication; for well-being, charitable and philanthropic foundations,
community chests, hospitals, old folk homes, employees' associations; for
affection, family organizations, fraternal orders, and private clubs; for recti-
tude, church organizations, temperance societies; for skill, professional asso-
ciations, occupational clubs; for power, patriotic societies; for respect, honor-
ary societies, organizations for the advancement of particular groups; and
so on. TMethods of establishment again cover a considerable range in private
agreement, declaration of trust, unincorporated association, incorporation
under general law, and incorporation under special "non-profit" provision.
Comprehensive survey of how community officials apply "property," "con-
tract," "tort," and "corporation" doctrines in promoting and regulating the
associations so established requires both precise determination of values at
stake and institutional context and, again, the careful specification of problem
information, financing, management, termination, or subjection to community
claims. Comparative study which makes such a survey could do much to
reveal the varying degrees of freedom and of efficiency in promoting basic
values in different societies.
POLICY PROCEDUMs
In the context of broad description of power processes and the relation
of doctrines and practices about agreements, deprivations, and private asso-
ciations to basic community values, comprehensive comparative study for
policy purposes may seek. finally, to explore in more detail the general pro-
cedures by which community coercion is organized and exercised in forming
and applying policy. In traditional terms such procedures are referred to as
legislative, executive, administrative, and judicial. It has long been common
knowledge, however, that these words have come to refer more to institutions
than to specific functions and that an institution labelled by any one of the
names may in fact engage in all procedures and perform all functions. It is,
accordingly, suggested that effective comparative inquiry requires a more
precise demarcation of functions and that such demarcation might be in mea-
sure achieved by some such categorization as the following: intelligence,
recommending, prescribing, invoking, applying, appraising, terminating. Brief
indication can be offered of the type and scope of inquiry under each
heading.
Intelligence. The intelligence function of a community is that by which
it keeps itself informed and projects its plans. The performance of this func-
tion requires the continuous and systematic study of conditions and trends,
inquiry into scientific interrelationships, the projection of developmental con-
tingencies, the clarification of goal values into detailed programs, and the
invention and appraisal of alternatives of action. The important question is
in what degree and how well these tasks are performed in what governmental
or non-governmental institutions. Comparative survey might reveal that in-
telligence and its use in planning are as necessary to discovering the minimum
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degree of authority and control conducive to democratic values as to main-
taining a maximum of governmental oppression and that it is suicidal mis-
identification to equate planning and regimentation.3
2
Recommendinig. This is the function of taking initiative, and exerting
pressure, to secure specific decisions. Relevant investigation is of the detailed
roles of political parties, pressure groups, and private associations in varying
contexts. Appraisal might extend beyond condemnation of vicious practices
to assay of the conditions under which more groups and individuals might
participate in the processes of effective control.
Prescribing. This is the function of the formal enactment of policy into
authoritative community doctrine. The most general questions are: How is
this function divided among legislative, executive, administrative, judicial,
and other institutions? How effectively is each institution organized for the
performance of its role? What are the detailed practices of each institution?
Appraisal may inquire whether structures and practices are democratic in
their responsibility to people affected, whether they are comprehensive in
taking adequate account of national, regional, and local interests, and whether
they are efficient (economic and prompt) in promoting and securing such
interests.
Invoking. This is the function of setting in motion the community ma-
chinery for the application of policy to concrete instances. It may be imposed
upon community officials (as in the case of crime or violation of charitable
trust) or left to private individuals (as in the case of private wrongs or
violations of the rules against perpetuities) and the important question is
what difference the location of this function makes for individual and com-
munity values.
Applying. This is the function of administering authoritatively prescribed
community policy in concrete instances. It again is divided among all the
conventional institutions of government-legislative, executive, administra-
tive, judicial-and comparative investigation requires specification of the
structures and practices of such institutions in performance of the function.
Some indication of the type of specification required may be made by
reference to judicial institutions.03 These institutions afford certain proce-
dures which the community maintains for settling controversies between
contending parties. Such procedures are designed to give both officials and
private individuals opportunity (access to formal authority) to test the be-
havior of other officials and private individuals for conformity with prescribed
standards and to secure the application of community coercion for maintain-
ing such conformity. The controversies for whose settlement judicial pro.
62. LAsswEL. & McDOUGAL, SYLLABUS, LAW, SCIENCE, AND POLICY (1950);
McDOUGAL & RoTIVAL, THE CASE FOR REGIONAL PLANNING WITH SPECIAL Rzrmtzncn
To NEW ENGLAND (1947).
63. A comprehensive outline of judicial procedures has been prepared by Professors
Keith Blinn, J. W. Bunkley, and George Pugh.
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cedures may be invoked obviously cover the whole range of community
values and all institutional contexts. The important general questions are:
Do procedural doctrines and practices vary in different controversies depend-
ing upon the values at stake and differences in institutional context? If so,
are such variations based upon rational conceptions of how best to promote
the various values in differing contexts? If not, should such variations be
made for such purposes? These questions may be made concrete with respect
to such various procedural steps as the following: for taking hold of the
defendant, for taking hold of the subject-matter of the controversy, for deter-
mining place and time of hearing, for enlightening the tribunal and the parties
concerning claims and demands, for disposing of the controversy through
agreed settlement, for presenting proof at trial, for determining conflicting
claims and ordering appropriate remedial action, for appeal and review, and
for executing judgment and enforcing remedial measures. Policy criteria
for appraising procedures may be sharpened in terms not only of efficiency
in promoting particular values but also of certain overriding community,
goals, such as equal opportunity to a fair hearing, decision in accordance
with the prescribed policies of the community, affording as much economy
to all parties as is consistent with other values, affording maximum respect
for human dignity with a minimum invasion of privacy or exercise of
violence, securing a maximum effect on the enlightenment processes of the
community and in ceremonializing the community values at stake, eliminat-
ing biased and prejudiced decision-makers, and encouraging a maximum use
of scientific knowledge in ascertaining facts and shaping remedies.
Appraising. This is a detailed application of the more general intelligence
function to continuing survey of the consequences of policy prescriptions
and applications. Comparative investigation is not likely to reveal common
occurrence.
Ternzinating. This is the function of putting an end to obsolete prescrip-
tions of policy. Commonly the function is performed by new prescription.
Special study of techniques for periodic revision and for resolving conflicts
between prescriptions of differing times may, however, be useful.
With some such comprehensive framework of guiding theory, it might be
possible for comparative study to rise to the challenge of contemporary need
and make its contribution to the more perfect union of the free world and
to the eventual organization of security and freedom throughout a peaceful
world community. Such a framework of theory would permit sufficiently
precise description of the events to which decision-makers respond in terms
of value changes which transcend the doctrinal peculiarities of particular
nation-states. It also would require the investigation by all the techniques
of modem science of how predispositional factors affecting decision, such as
character structure, class position, skills, and attitudes, vary from nation-
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state to nation-state and from context to context within nation-states. Hence
it would make possible a meaningful survey through time of how different
decision-makers, with their varying predispositions, appropriately located in
different nation-states apply technical doctrines of varying degrees of equival-
ence to comparable problems to achieve identifiable effects on values.
The importance for policy, for the freedom and rationality of future decision,
of the knowledge that might be so obtained is beyond present calculation.
Communities might find, as individuals have found, that insightful knowl-
edge of the past and clear prevision of future alternatives immeasurably
increases potentialities. Though the universals it yields may ultimately be
few, comparative study at its best might reveal the details of short-term,
emerging relationships with unexpectedly high probability." Though it may
never induce change in basic democratic values, such comparative study
might also supply the continuing flow of knowledge by which specific opera-
tional interpretations can be given value goals and such goals be kept up to
date. Enlargement of the context of community and power processes being
observed can certainly be expected only to enlarge knowledge of expedients
and alternatives and increase the possibilities of invention.
The hope that comparative study for policy purposes offers is, in sum,
that of understanding the power and other value processes in which we live
and of achieving the special insights necessary to effective cooperation and
survival in the contemporary world. Denied the experimental method open
to the physical sciences, applied legal science has no rational alternative
to such study. Should the challenge outlined appear too formidable, it may
be relevant to recall the principle, once invoked by a great comparative
scholar, 5 that "the standard of human performance is apt, though not sure,
to rise in proportion to the magnitude of an undertaking."
64. The exposure of past rigidities in behavior may, it will perhaps bear emphasis,
increase appreciation of opportunities for future change. The function of science in legal
study is not so much that of predicting inevitabilities, as of stating the conditions of free-
dom.
65. The late Ernst Freund. Cf. Margaret Mead, The Comparative Study of Culture
and the Purposive Cultivation of Democratic Values in CONFERENCE ON SciENCE, Pin-
LOSOPHY AND RELIGION 56, 65 (1942): "Comparison of different cultures demonstrates
that man may set his spiritual goal low or high. that he may cast himself a cheap or a
heroic role, and that as he casts himself, so will he live and his children after him."
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